Globalization and Marginalization in Africa: Poverty, Risk and Vulnerability in rural Ethiopia by Stefan Dercon (QEH)
QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS147  Page 1 
 
  1 
Working Paper Number 147 
 
 
Globalization and Marginalization in Africa: 








Increased openness is seen by some as a panacea for development while for others it is a 
recipe for disaster for the poor. Using the example of Ethiopia, this paper discusses some 
of  the  key  challenges  faced  by  some  of  the  poorest  African  countries  to  beneficially 
engage in the world economy.  Worldwide income growth has largely bypassed many 
African countries, and large parts of their populations risk increasing marginalization.  
This  paper  documents  the  challenges  faced  by  one  of  these  countries,  Ethiopia,  by 
highlighting first the impact of a first wave of liberalization in the early 1990s, using the 
evidence from a rural panel data set. It was found that while liberalization had some 
positive effects in this particular period, the benefits were largely confined to those with 
good assets, not least in terms of geography and road infrastructure. In subsequent years, 
access to infrastructure seems to have been causing even further growth and poverty 
divergence  within  rural  Ethiopia.  This  evidence  suggests  that  access  to  better 
infrastructure  and  communications  will  be  key  to  have  beneficial  effects  of  further 
liberalization and engagement with the world econoy. Finally, we find some evidence that 
liberalization has shifted the nature of risks towards a higher incidence of market related 
risks with an impact on households, such as sudden output price collapses or input price 
increases. While it is not possible to infer from this that vulnerability to poverty has 
necessarily increased, one would need to recognize that these shifts in risk will require 
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1. Introduction 
 
The  impact  of  globalization  on  the  poor  is  one  of  the  most  emotive  debates  in  the 
development  policy  community.  NGOs  have  been  arguing  that  it  is  a  process  with 
disproportionate benefits for rich countries and multinationals, leaving poor countries and 
people behind (e.g. Oxfam (2000)). The World Bank has been arguing in its in influential 
report on globalization (World Bank, 2002)) that it is not true that globalization makes 
rich  people  richer  and  poor  people  poorer:  poverty  is  falling  rapidly  in  those  poor 
countries that are integrating into the global economy. In this paper, I will revisit some of 
the arguments used in this debate, but with a focus on one particular context, Ethiopia, 
one of the poorest countries in the world. My focus will be on its impact on the poor in 
this country, using evidence from rural panel data, and focusing not just on the level of 
poverty and its change but also on the risks in their livelihoods that may follow from 
globalization. 
 
But one point should be clear from the outset. Given the nature of the question – the 
impact of globalization – the empirical analysis of this question using actual observed 
micro-data  is  highly  problematic  and  close  to  impossible.  I  can  point  to  two 
methodological reasons for this. First, in the general debate, globalization is used as an 
evocative term describing the closer integration of societies and economies around the 
world.  Integration  is  linked  to  lower  trade  barriers,  reduced  costs  of  transport,  faster 
communication, including of ideas, and rising capital flows.  It is a composite concept 
and by its nature, vague in terms of what it actually describes. It is also a gradual process 
rather than a well-defined change at one particular moment in time.   
 
Furthermore, there is no doubt that something like ‘globalization’ is taking place across 
the world and Ethiopia is to some extent affected. But even if we may be able to define a 
general  process  as  describing  “globalization”,  inference  on  its  impact  is  highly 
problematic by the common lack of a well-defined counterfactual in the data available.  
Most studies appear to attribute observed changes over time in living standards and risk 
to globalization or specific aspects of it.  But many things change over time, and many of 
these  processes  are  common  factors  in  the  data  and  typically  cannot  be  separately 
identified in the data. For example, simply observing more exports of a crop such as 
coffee (Ethiopia’s most important export crop) may be due to opportunities offered by 
globalization,  but  it  could  also  be  due  to  improved  extension  services  increasing 
productivity, or just a terms of trade change related to domestic returns to alternative 
crops. In short, analyzing ‘globalization’ as a ‘natural experiment’ is hardly possible, and 
more structural modeling is required to understand its impact.  
 
We have no perfect solution, and in this paper we simply try to bring persuasive evidence 
on one particular aspect of globalization: the likely impact of further trade liberalization 
on households, in terms of returns to their activities, their growth rate and the risks they 
face. We do this by assessing the impact of one specific period of liberalization, and its 
short-run impact on household living standards and its subsequent impact on risks faced. 
The period is well-defined (the liberalization from a strict control regime between 1989-
91) and even though other factors may well have caused some of the observed evolution QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS147  Page 3 
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of living standards, the evidence is sufficiently compelling to offer a persuasive narrative 
of how liberalization worked.  In particular, in line with the theory of the impact of trade 
liberalization and the empirical evidence surrounding it (Winters et al. 2004), there seem 
to be relative winners and losers.  Furthermore, since the evidence comes from panel 
data, we can look at some more long-run impact of the relative price change, thereby 
approximating the ‘growth’ effect of liberalization. Finally, since some continuing data 
collection took place to monitor the impact of risk and shocks, we can at least offer some 
suggestive evidence on how this period may have changed the risk environment faced by 
Ethiopian rural households. Taken together, a sense of the impact on poverty, poverty 
changes  and  the  vulnerability  to  poverty  related  to  this  liberalization  episode  can  be 
constructed. 
  
However, to put this micro-level evidence better into perspective, we offer first a more 
general view on how we think that globalization is currently affecting a country such as 
Ethiopia,  with  its  defining  and  problematic  features  in  the  African  context.  This 
discussion is first introduced in the next section, covering relatively well trodden terrain 
and where it is argued that despite some apparent advantages of integration into the world 
economy,  large  parts  of  Africa  may  well  have  missed  the  boat.  In  section  3,  this 
discussion is made more specific to an economy such as the Ethiopian economy. Section 
4 then introduces the liberalization phase studied, and studies the micro-level evidence 
between  1989  to  1999.  Section  5  then  offers  some  insights  on  the  changing  risk 
environment  that  may  have  affected  the  risk-related  vulnerability  faced  by  these 
households. 
 
2. The Globalization Debate and Africa: Theory and Macro-Evidence 
 
In this section, I will try to introduce some elements of the debate on globalization and 
the poor in Africa, first covering rather familiar arguments, but preparing the ground to 
test the plausibility of the arguments for a country like Ethiopia. One has to be careful to 
identify correctly the ‘theory’ of beneficial globalization, not least when (as we will do) 
will  focus  largely  on  the  impact  of  trade  liberalization  on  Africa’s  poor.    Simply 
speaking,  globalization  theory  as  applied  to  trade  is  the  combination  of  standard 
arguments for free trade and markets, combined with an appeal to a growth effect from 
the trade regime.  This is different from the results from standard trade theory, which 
simply predicts ‘gains from trade’ from exploiting comparative advantage – effectively a 
once-and-for-all increase in output and income. The ‘globalization’ argument appeals to 
ever  increasing  output  –  growth  –  induced  by  openness.    In  the  parlance  of  the 
endogenous  growth  literature,  it  suggests  that  trade-orientation  is  a  specific  ‘initial 
condition’, affecting long-run steady state output and growth.  The mechanism by which 
openness  affects  growth  could  be  manifold:  from  incentives  to  increase  efficiency 
following more competition to the development of better market-orientated institutions 
from the confrontation with the rest of the world. 
 
As is well known, the impact on the poor is typically not well identified in theory – if 
only since most growth models are representative agent models. However, the argument 
typically is an extension of the standard distributional impact of the trade liberalization in QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS147  Page 4 
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standard  theory  –  based  on  the  Hecksher-Ohlin  model,  or  related  insights  from  the 
Stolper-Samuelson setup. In particular, labour is the most abundant factor in most poor 
developing  countries,  so  that  trade  liberalization  would  encourage  specialization  in 
labour-intensive production, increasing labour demand. Labour is usually the only asset 
of the poor so that trade liberalization results in poverty reduction. The growth effects 
from openness further contribute to poverty reduction, via increased labour demand.  
 
There  is  empirical  evidence  of  the  expansion  of  labour-intensive  production  in 
developing countries, consistent with their comparative advantage. Davis and Weinstein 
(2003)  found  that  developing  country  exports  as  a  whole  are  now  indeed  labour-
intensive. Countries such as China, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Indonesia – due to 
their population size constituting the majority of the population of the developing world - 
all have a share of manufacturing in total exports above or close to the world average.  
There  is  also  evidence  of  substantial  poverty  reduction  in  a  number  of  developing 
countries over recent decades, most notably in China, where between 1978 and 1999 the 
number of poor declined by more than 200 million. Other more recent success stories 
include Vietnam, where poverty was cut in half in the 1990s, while poverty reductions 
have been observed in India and Uganda, possibly directly linked with this evolution. 
 
A hotly debated issue is the role of trade liberalization and openness as causes of growth 
and poverty reduction. With some minimally imaginative presentation of the available 
data, the success in poverty reduction is typically larger in countries that have been able 
to increase their share of trade to GDP substantially since the 1980. World Bank (2002) 
defines the ‘globalizers’ as the top third of developing countries in terms of the extent 
that they have been able to increase their trade share in this period – in total about 3 
billion people, dominated by China and India in terms of population
2.  It is indeed the 
case  that  on  average  these  ‘globalizers’  have  been  more  successful  both  in  terms  of 
growth and poverty reduction than the other developing countries. The presence of China 
and India in this group is then largely responsible for a global decline in absolute poverty 
levels in the 1990s. This needs to be qualified by the fact that inequality has nevertheless 
increased in the largest ‘globalizer’, China, although not necessarily in other countries in 
this group. 
 
But the use of the term ‘globalizers’ may be misleading
3: the fact that trade increased is 
not  necessarily  caused  by  a  conscious  policy  of  trade,  exchange  rate  and  financial 
liberalization. The causal link between openness, growth and poverty reduction is harder 
to proof, and is still hotly debated. For example, Dollar (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995) 
and Dollar and Kraay (2001) claim that liberal trade policies cause growth. Rodriguez 
and Rodrik (1999) argue that these studies are methodologically flawed and that they 
mainly show that good economic institutions matter for growth, not trade-orientation. In 
Rodrik’s view, liberalization may not be all that important and activist policies could well 
                                                 
2 The group also includes Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines and Thailand, 
and some other smaller countries.    
3 World Bank (2002) is aware of this possible misleading use of the term ‘globalizers’ noting that the rise in 
trade may not have been the consequence of pro-trade policies but ‘may have been due to other policies or 
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bring about more substantial trade and growth increases. Dollar and Kraay (2001) further 
show that there is a one-to-one relationship in mean income growth and income growth 
of the poorest 20 percent, leading to the insight that ‘growth is good for the poor’, which 
should be properly understood as meaning that inequality is not affected: proportionately, 
the gap between the poor and the mean individual remains constant. They argue further 
that trade does not change this relationship. Ravallion (2002) finds compelling evidence 
that while on average openness does not affect inequality, in low income countries it is 
associated with greater inequality. He also finds that even though on average growth is 
inequality-neutral,  beyond  this  average  there  is  a  diversity  of  experiences  across  the 
world, with some growth episodes coinciding with increases in inequality and other with 
decreases in inequality. 
 
The  notion  that  openness  may  not  deliver  growth  and  poverty  reduction  should  be 
qualified. There is no evidence of any countries succeeding in bringing down poverty 
substantially  without  increasing  growth  (Ravallion,  2002).  There  is  also  not  much 
evidence of countries in the world delivering substantial growth via persistent protection, 
or of countries that have been able to increase their growth rates by increasing protection. 
Openness may well be  a characteristic of successful economies, possibly  a necessary 
condition, but its importance and sufficiency is still debatable.  
 
While some developing countries have been able to increase growth and their trade share, 
and reduce poverty, many others have failed in all these respects. Most of Africa and 
quite a few Asian and Latin-American countries are in this situation, comprising about 
between  one  billion  people.  If  anything,  many  of  these  countries  appear  to  become 
increasingly marginalized in the world economy, with negative per capita growth rates in 
the recent decade and small but significant increases in poverty levels, and possibly even 
‘club convergence’ towards permanently lower levels of income per capita.  A key issue 
is then to understand why. A simple explanation may be that they had bad policies, not 
least in terms of trade orientation. But this cannot be the full story: quite a few of these 
African, Asian and Latin American countries did introduce some trade liberalization in 
the  last  two  decades,  but  with  little  impact  in  terms  of  sustained  growth.  A  related 
explanation  is  that  even  with  trade  liberalization,  growth  is  being  stifled  by  poor 
infrastructure,  low  education  and  corruption.  Again,  this  would  suggest  that  policy 
makers bear a substantial responsibility for low growth and the persistence of poverty. 
However, there are alternative possible explanations. One suggestive one is that some 
countries suffer from the fundamental disadvantages of location – landlocked disease-
prone  tropical  countries  with  harsh  natural  environments  face  a  fundamental  cost 
disadvantage  (Sachs  and  Warner  1995).    There  is  indeed  evidence  for  Africa  that 
marketing and transport costs are substantially higher, but these are largely influenced by 
investment  in  the  quality  of  infrastructure.  For  example,  Collier  and  Gunning  (1999) 
report that port charges in Abidjan are far higher than in Antwerp: a container costs $200 
in the former compared to $120. Air transport in Africa is four times as expensive as in 
Asia,  while  rail  freight  charges  are  about  double.  In  short,  the  differential  growth 
experience  between  some  of  the  largest  Asian  economies  compared  to  Africa  cannot 
easily be explained by simple geographical disadvantage.  
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Whatever the reason for the past failure of some of developing countries to increase their 
growth rates and trade shares, there is reason to be concerned that they may ‘have missed 
the  boat’  (World  Bank  (2002)).    Possible  reasons  could  be  that  increasing  returns  in 
manufacturing activities and general agglomeration effects, i.e. externalities to locating in 
the same geographical areas, would have meant that firms locate in clusters. While many 
clusters could be formed, firms have already located in some labour-abundant economies 
so that latecomers have little to offer.  Furthermore, the mere fact that some developing 
countries with similar initial characteristics have not missed the boat may induce further 
negative externalities from globalization: not only will firms not locate in the latecomers, 
increased  capital  market  liberalization  in  the  globalizing  economies,  so  that  capital 
inflows are easier, will encourage capital to flow away from the marginal economies. 
This could happen even if these marginal economies did not liberalize capital markets; in 
that case via illegal capital flight. For example, by 1990, 40 percent of private African 
wealth was held outside Africa, even though capital is scarcer in Africa than anywhere 
else  in  the  world  (Collier,  Hoeffler  and  Pattillo,  2001).  Another  self-perpetuating 
mechanism of marginalization includes the apparent higher risk of civil war in economies 
more heavily dependent on primary commodities, increasing the cost of its failure to 
engage in the world economy (Collier, Hoeffler and Pattillo, 2001).  
 
All this paints rather a bleak future for these marginal economies, not least in Africa. 
They  may  be  stuck  in  a  growth  and  poverty  trap  –  an  equilibrium  outcome  with 
permanently  low  growth  and  high  poverty.  While  plausible,  there  is  no  reason  for 
uniform pessimism, although naïve optimism would be misplaced as well. In recent few 
decades a number of countries, often written off by experts, have been able to transform 
themselves. For example, World Bank (2002) quotes how Nobel winner Gunnar Myrdal 
wrote off Indonesia in the 1960s only for it to emerge in the 1980s as a fast growing 
economy substantially reducing poverty aided by labour-intensive manufacturing exports. 
Even after the serious crisis of the late 1990s, poverty is far lower than in the early 1980s. 
Similarly, after descending into chaos and civil war in the first part of the 1980s, Uganda 
has emerged as a fast growing economy, delivering large poverty reduction in both rural 
and urban areas.  
 
However, the change required in many developing countries is substantial. If the current 
outcomes are an equilibrium growth and poverty trap, then mere small changes would be 
ineffective. If there are indeed multiple equilibria at play, then only a substantial ‘shock’ 
may bring these countries onto a higher growth path. Few would argue that mere trade 
orientation would do the trick. A drastic transformation of the investment climate, with 
better institutions and infrastructure would be required, as well as much improved public 
service delivery of education and health services to increase the human capital is likely to 
be required to fully capture the benefits from new investment. Globalization may have 
moved the production processes of many goods across the world, making multinational 
companies  the  scourge  of  anti-globalization  campaigners  across  the  world.  But  many 
multinationals do not even appear to consider investing in these marginal economies, not 
least in Africa.  
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3. Globalization, Marginalization and Ethiopia 
 
Suppose, as is plausible, that many African economies are best characterized as having 
missed the boat in world economic growth and with initial characteristics clearly pointing 
to  at  least  a  fundamentally  lower  steady  state  growth  rate  than  some  of  the  Asian 
emerging economies. Furthermore, suppose that, as is again plausible, the international 
process of allocating capital has few if any incentives at present to move capital to Africa. 
This can be seen as caused by a combination of poor ‘initial characteristics’ such as a 
poor  political  and  physical  infrastructure  and  a  related  high  risk  investment  climate. 
Furthermore, as was argued before, increasing returns in manufacturing activities and 
general  agglomeration  effects,  a  growth  ‘trap’  may  have  developed  with  little  or  no 
incentives currently to move any manufacturing activities at any scale to Africa. This will 
create further constraints for Africa to rise to the challenge and induce a virtuous cycle of 
export-led growth (with its plausible self-reinforcing productivity enhancing process to 
sustain growth) or indeed any other growth process. 
 
Before  discussing  the  implications  for  understanding  the  impact  of  globalization  on 
Ethiopia, it is worth qualifying the above to account for some of the clear heterogeneity 
in  Africa.  Broadly  speaking,  one  could  consider  three  Africas:  one  consists  of  the 
resource-rich economies such as Nigeria, Congo or Botswana; a second group is Coastal 
Africa with potentially access to relatively low cost transport of commodities to the rest 
of  the  world,  with  parts  of  countries  such  as  Ghana,  Cote  d’Ivoire  or  Kenya  and 
Tanzania; and the third group is landlocked Africa, without harbours and with limited 
natural resources – Ethiopia clearly springs to mind, but also Uganda or Burkina Faso. 
The main constraints on these countries effectively engaging in world economic growth 
and indeed, just attaining growth and poverty reduction at home are quite different.  
 
Take the resource-rich economies. Here the problem is not so much a problem of scarcity 
but  to  some  extent  a  problem  of  apparent  affluence.  The  main  issue  for  growth  and 
poverty  reduction would appear to be macroeconomic policy and  general governance 
issues: how to ensure that the economy is not fundamentally undermined by the pressures 
caused by Dutch Disease (including the incentives to move away from productive and 
tradable activities), and how to ensure that the richness earned by the government and by 
the country in general can handled in a transparent, uncorrupt way to enhance living 
standards and to invest in the future, such as in health, education and infrastructure. The 
globalization process presents further opportunities and pressures but is possibly not the 
essential issue for these economies to grow and reduce poverty.  
 
The second set of countries definitely has more to gain or lose from globalization: those 
with relatively good connections to world markets due to their location in coastal Africa. 
For these countries, trying to be competitive in attracting investment for manufacturing 
production  (or  indeed  keeping  African  capital  in  their  own  continent  for  productive 
purposes) is the real challenge. The rise and rise of an export-orientated manufacturing 
industry across Asia, including China and more recently in India, consistent with the 
presence of agglomeration effects make the emergence or indeed survival of domestic 
industrial  production  difficult.  Key  issues  here  have  to  be  to  promote  the  domestic QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS147  Page 8 
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competitiveness (including issues related to trade or labour market regulation), further 
infrastructural  development  as  well  as  basic  issues  of  macroeconomic  management, 
including financial market development. WTO rules are bound to limit the instruments 
allowed to promote the emergence or sustaining of these industries in these latecomers in 
the globalizing economy. Liberalizing reforms, combined with substantial investment in 
human capital (health, education and skills) appear necessary but are bound not to be 
sufficient. The hurdles they have to climb are tremendous, and a dependence on some 
preferential  treatment  vis-à-vis  Asian  manufacturing  industries  in  terms  of  access  to 
European and US markets may well be necessary and desirable.  
 
But  there  is  a  third  group  for  whom  the  relative  luxury  of  natural  resources  and  the 
opportunities  of  relatively  good  location  and  infrastructure  are  missing:  land-locked 
economies  with  few  resources,  largely  dependent  on  agriculture  and  a  urban-based 
service  sector  with  effectively  only  a  small  manufacturing  base  without  much  export 
orientation. Its dependence on agriculture means that export earnings will continue to 
have to come from this sector, but an increasingly integrated world economy would also 
mean that graduating from an export-orientated agricultural sector to a more diversified 
export-orientated non-agricultural sector will be a slow and difficult process. Agricultural 
productivity growth may be a partial solution – but the poor location of these countries 
may  well  make  the  move  of  some  its  population  to  more  coastal  or  at  least  better 
connected areas a more effective strategy – of course, not by any coercion but rather, if 
immigration policies allow it, by the voluntary move in response to increased incentives 
from these areas. A land-locked economy fitting this bill is Burkina Faso, with much of 
its  productive  population  already  for  many  decades  active  in  countries  such  as  Cote 
d’Ivoire, even though the pressures on these host economies have made this strategy a 
less plausible one for the Burkinabes.  
 
So where does this leave this a country like Ethiopia? Arguably, it starts with some of the 
worst endowments possible for an active part in the globalization game. It is (since 1996) 
land-locked, and on poor terms with its nearest neighbour, Eritrea, and dependent on 
Djibouti for any exports. Its economic base is still largely agricultural, with coffee the 
main export earner. In principle, it has embraced the necessity to liberalize the economy 
to engage in the world economy, although in practice. It started with economic reform 
towards a more market orientated economy over the last decade, but it is hard to find 
evidence of a real transformation. Some quarters of Addis Ababa appear to experience a 
boom, but these are largely an aid-fuelled real-estate led expansion of the non-tradable 
sector.  Some  urban  centres  with  their  surrounding  countryside  appear  to  have 
experienced  strong  growth  in  recent  year,  but  their  scale  is  too  small  to  suggest  the 
establishment of serious growth poles.  It remains on the fringes of the world economy, 
with only its coffee ever appearing in shopping baskets in Europe. Poverty levels have 
declined a little, but population growth has meant that the number of poor has probably 
increased in the last 10 years.  
 
It has only just emerged from another war, this time with Eritrea, which it only 10 years 
ago granted independence. Even if observers and most international donors do not pin 
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political  instability,  with  civil  war  also  raging  in  neighbouring  Sudan  and  continuing 
anarchy in parts of former Somalia. It is at the moment of writing threatening to embark 
on  another  military  adventure  in  Somalia.  Its  own  political  institutions  remain 
characterised by a reluctance to grant much voice to opposition groups, after a recent 
brief spring in terms of freedom of expression in the national media.  Ethnic tensions 
remain substantial.  Its infrastructure has improved in recent years but it still has only a 
very limited road and communications network. There is evidence of some improvement 
in education as well, but skill and health levels remain generally poor.  As one would 
expect in this type of risky environment, only limited Ethiopian capital is productively 
used within Ethiopia. Most strikingly this applies to human capital, with many skilled 
Ethiopians living abroad, and if possible in the US or Canada, in low skilled professions 
such as taxi-driving in Washington DC.  
 
But  Ethiopia  should  be  given  some  credit.  It  has  a  relatively  competent  and  broadly 
speaking, not a corrupt civil service. While using antiquated and opaque procedures, it 
governance tends to be relatively efficient. Its macroeconomic policy management has 
made  the  birr  a  remarkably  stable  currency,  even  during  the  years  of  civil  war  and 
famine
4. It appears committed to reform, even though opening up appears to go slowly, 
not least after the recent Eritrean-Ethiopian war and the recent political tensions related to 
the  2005  elections.    Recurrent  drought  puts  much  pressure  on  efforts  to  transform 
agriculture, even if there is also evidence of improved ability to manage these drought-
induced crises in the short run using food aid and other transfer mechanisms. Its policy 
makers recognize the importance of agricultural growth, and there is some evidence of 
growth in agricultural productivity but only for a limited number of crops (such as maize) 
and  then  well  below  the  expectations  raised  by  the  agricultural  extension  and  input 
programmes that started in the mid-1990s. 
 
Poverty  and  growth  traps  may  ask  for  bold  measures,  in  the  form  of  risk-taking  in 
economic policy to enforce a regime change, even though recent economic history across 
the world suggests that one cannot guarantee success. The political economy in Ethiopia 
with  serious  suspicions  towards  the  government  among  the  nascent  middle-classes 
suggests  that  gradual  reform  may  only  be  possible,  even  if  possibly  insufficient.  An 
improved investment climate requires not only a commitment to change; it requires that 
this  commitment  is  credible  to  local  and  foreign  investors.  At  present,  the  policy 
environment  is  not  sufficiently  credible,  also  affecting  the  willingness  of  donors  to 
commit  at  a  large  scale  the  essential  foreign  aid  to  support  the  transformation  of 
institutions, public services and infrastructure, which supported for example the Ugandan 
success story.  
 
But even if economic and political regime change may come about, the nature of its 
landlocked,  agricultural  economy  means  that  expectations  cannot  be  too  high. 
Liberalization of the economy, and increased export-orientation is likely to be a sensible 
                                                 
4 In 1970, the Kenyan Shilling, the Tanzanian Shilling, the Ugandan Shilling and the Ethiopian Birr were 
all trading at 2 to the U.S. Dollar. The exchange rates are now about 76 Kenyan Shillings per dollar, 1070 
Tanzanian Shillings per dollar and 2000 Ugandan Shillings per dollar, while the Ethiopian Birr is trading at 
8.5 Birr per dollar.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS147  Page 10 
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strategy, contributing to some further investment in different sectors
5, but at best it will 
(in terms of sustained long-term growth) only be able to contribute to a modest growth. 
Export  agriculture  can  provide  a  steady  source  of  growth,  but  evidence  from  other 
countries suggest that it is hardly likely to generate much high-productivity job creation, 
necessary for large scale poverty reduction (Teal, 2005).  
 
Still, in Ethiopia, this type of growth is essential to avoid falling further behind and the 
main first round impact from any process towards globalization will have to come from 
trade liberalization, and its impact on the rural sector. In the remainder of this paper we 
will focus on the short and long-term impacts of increased liberalization on the rural 
sector and its poor, based on assessing its impact in a rural panel data sample.  
 
4.  Evidence  from  a  trade  liberalization  episode  on  living  standards  and 
poverty in Ethiopia 1989-1995. 
 
Identifying  the  impact  of  trade  liberalization  on  living  conditions  and  poverty  is 
complicated since most episodes occur both gradually and in the context of numerous 
other reforms. However, as will be argued further, the biggest change in terms of trade 
liberalization occurred around 1991 in Ethiopia, and data are available  to isolate this 
episode to assess its impact in rural Ethiopia. It provides therefore a unique opportunity 
to assess how such change has affected households differentially, in terms of subsequent 
living standards levels and growth, as well as risk. 
 
Our method is to try to first identify the impact of the liberalization in the short-run, via 
its impact on relative prices and its subsequent impact on consumption outcomes in a 
number of villages in rural Ethiopia by 1994, and on poverty outcomes. Then, we extend 
the analysis to the medium term, by assessing whether the particular episode has a clear 
impact  on  the  subsequent  growth  between  1994  to  1999  in  these  villages.  This  is 
important, since one of the main argument in favour of these liberalization episodes is 
related to subsequent growth effects, not just ‘first round’ effects in terms of the short-run 
impact of a relative price change. Finally, we use a larger sample to briefly comment on 
some of the factors that appear to matter substantially for growth, therefore putting our 
specific results in a somewhat broader context. In the next section, we will briefly extent 
the analysis to ‘risk’ related to this and other liberalization episodes.  
 
As  part  of  its  moves  to  a  more  market  based  economy  from  a  centrally  controlled 
‘socialist’  economy,  the  Ethiopian  government  liberalized  its  domestic  agricultural 
markets between 1989 and 1992. Combined with the end of the civil war in 1991 and the 
liberalization of the movement of goods across regions around the same time, this change 
can  be  seen  as  an  overall  trade  liberalization  between  regions,  from  a  situation  of 
regionally closed economies. Before 1989, most trade between regions was either banned 
or very heavily taxed (Dercon (2002)), so that internally, the Ethiopian economy more 
resembled a set of closed economies with high tariff barriers limiting the free flow of 
                                                 
5 For example, one has seen in recent years some horticultural investment (including for rose production) 
focused on the export market by air. Again, while important and innovative, the scale remains relatively 
small. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS147  Page 11 
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goods and services. The liberalization within Ethiopia from 1989 was then in the first 
instance a move to greater openness between regions within a country, not unlike the 
changes  advocated  by  international  institutions  between  countries.    The  growth  and 
distributional  impact  of  these  changes  can  be  studied  using  the  Ethiopian  Rural 
Household Survey, a panel data survey covering households in different communities 
from 1989 until 2004. Lessons from studying welfare changes in this period are likely to 
be relevant to understand the implications on the poor of trade and investment policy 
liberalization. Dercon and Krishnan (2002) and Dercon (2002) give more details on the 
data and the findings. The results related to the first phase of trade liberalization, between 
1989 and 1995, are briefly summarized below. They are only based on a small sample of 
354 households in six different communities across the country. No other data covering 
this period exist in Ethiopia. Dercon (2006) gives much more detail. Our focus will be on 
the relative prices changes resulting from liberalization, and its impact on households. 
The first issue is then to identify the price change induced by liberalization. 
 
The policy measures meant that compared to before 1989, agricultural crops could move 
freely across regional borders within the country, without trade restrictions and heavy 
tariffs. Cereals such as teff, wheat and maize were most strongly affected. The result was 
that there was downward pressure on staple food crop prices in food deficit areas while 
they increased in surplus areas following liberalization. A further measure allowing free 
entry  in  many  trade  and  other  business  activities  meant  that  food  and  other  markets 
became spatially more integrated, resulting in lower marketing margins (Dercon (1995)).  
The measures had less impact on previously smuggled crops, such as coffee and chat: 
now legally traded, prices settled at first close to the levels seen in black markets before 
the liberalization, while a decline in world coffee prices meant actual declines in prices 
for coffee farmers. Finally, crops that were typically non-traded across regional borders, 
such as bulky permanent crops like enset and yams, became relatively less interesting to 
grow, since they were typically grown in cereal deficit areas, where consumer now could 
benefit from decreases in staple food prices. The overall result was that terms of trade 
moved very favourably for farmers in food surplus areas, especially in cereal areas, but 
they (relatively) declined for farmers specializing in export crops such as coffee and chat, 
as well as in less traded crops such as enset. The evidence from the six survey villages 
broadly confirms these patterns. Table 1 gives the finding on the real producer price 
changes (i.e. relative to a food price deflator) between 1989 and 1995. Note that these 
changes in indexes are based on average changes per village: the underlying index is 
household specific, with weights related to the share of income from each crop at the 
household level. The result is that there household-specific heterogeneity in this index, 
useful for further analysis. 
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Table 1  Real producer prices (Percentage increases relative to 1989
a) 








DOMAA  AVERAGE 
All crops  +28  +21  +12  +65  -37  +35  +26 
Tradables
c  +28  +23  +15  +65  -12  +49  +31 
Non-tradables
d      -38    -77  -23   
Food  +31  +21  +25  +65  -37  +35  +28 
Coffee          +49     
Chat      -9         
Source: ERHS and Central Statistical Authority 
aPercentage changes in terms of trade, based on the movement of producer prices relative to food price 
inflation. The producer prices for different crops are weighted using the contribution to total crop income in 
1994 of each crop (including production for home consumption), with different weights for each 
household. The reported figures are based on the producer price indexes, averaged across households in 
each community and across the sample. Producer prices for all indexes were taken from publications on 
rural producer prices at the sub-regional level, collected by the Central Statistical Authority.  To achieve 
maximum comparability, only consumer prices collected by the Central Statistical Authority were used as 
well. Data were compiled for the same months so that differences do not reflect seasonality.   
bQuota crops: only using crops for which a quota had to be sold to the government parastatal. 
cTradables: regularly traded food and cash crops in Ethiopia, i.e. most cereals and cash crops. 
dNon-tradables: crops such as enset and sweet potatoes. 
eBlank spaces mean that the crop is not found in this particular area. 
 
On average, the villages saw their terms of trade
6 improve by about a quarter. The highest 
positive change in tradable crop prices occurred in villages situated in broad surplus areas 
(Korogegaga, for example, is near to Arsi, one of the main cereal producing areas in the 
country), while non-tradables generally saw declines in their prices. Tradable prices went 
up, but not in deficit areas – such as in Gara Godo, the only coffee village in the sample, 
despite the boom in coffee prices.  
 
This  leads  to  confirming  a  standard  result  on  the  impact  of  liberalization:  good  for 
producers and net sellers of tradables and net buyers of non-tradables, not so good for net 
buyers of tradables and for producers of non-tradables. In a rural economy, all possible 
combinations of these types of households will co-exist, although typically in different 
areas. It leads to an important point for further analysis: the impact of the relative price 
change in terms of incentives to produce will depend on whether the household is net 
seller of what it produces or not.  
 
Next, we build on Dercon (2006) to provide a simple regression analysis on the impact of 
the  improved  price  incentives  for  tradables  after  liberalization,  by  regression 
consumption  growth  between  1989  and  1995  on  changes  in  the  terms  of  trade,  but 
allowing  for  differential  responses  between  food  surplus  farmers  and  deficit  farmers. 
(Note that by definition, all farmers are net sellers of non-food crops, such as coffee and 
chat. Even though some coffee and chat tends to be consumed as well, this seems a safe 
assumption.)  In order to analyze the impact of the relative price change, we need to 
ensure  that  any  inference  is  not  spurious:  we  need  to  try  to  control  for  any  other 
                                                 
6 Terms of trade are here defined as a (Laspeyres) output-weighted producer price deflated by a local 
consumer price index, using 1989 as a base. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS147  Page 13 
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underlying factors that may explain changes in food consumption (note that no non-food 
consumption is available for 1989). This is definitely important given the size of the 
consumption changes observed in these villages, as shown in table 2 
 
Table 2 Changes in food consumption per adult equivalent (between 1989 and 
1994/95 
(in birr, 1994 prices) (n=354) (6 birr » » » » 1 US $) 










Mean food consumption  1989  50  53  64  37  27  25  42 
Mean food consumption 1994  62  96  108  40  20  80  64 
Head count 1989  0.42  0.34  0.42  0.73  0.80  0.86  0.61 
Poverty Gap 1989  0.14  0.12  0.10  0.39  0.46  0.45  0.29 
Squared Poverty Gap 1989  0.07  0.05  0.05  0.25  0.30  0.27  0.17 
Head count 1994/95  0.57  0.26  0.16  0.62  0.95  0.39  0.51 
Poverty Gap 1994/95  0.19  0.06  0.04  0.22  0.53  0.23  0.22 
Squared Poverty Gap 1994/95  0.09  0.02  0.02  0.10  0.34  0.16  0.12 
Source: own calculations from Ethiopian Rural Household Survey. Food consumption is deflated by a food price deflator, using 
regional prices collected by the Central Statistical Authority. Consumption is expressed in 1994 prices. The nutritional equivalence 
scales used, and more details on the data are described in Dercon (2002). 
  
Overall, poverty, based on absolute poverty line, declined substantially in this period in 
the sample: the number of poor households declined by about a third in our sample, even 
though it still kept more than a 40 percent of households poor. There appears to be a 
correlation  to  the  terms  of  trade  changes,  with  the  extent  of  the  poverty  decline  per 
village correlated with the terms of trade change.  In fact, in the two villages were terms 
of trade declined, poverty did not decline at all, and it increased substantially in one of 
them. However, this is not the full story. Terms of trade changes do not affect every 
household in a village in the same way, while the other liberalization measures may also 
provide opportunities or introduce other costs on households.  
 
In order to control for both this heterogeneity and the possibility of spurious correlation, 
we run a regression explaining the growth in food consumption regressed on initial assets 
and characteristics, including land, household size (measured in terms of adult equivalent 
units), education, geography (distance to nearest town) and road infrastructure (whether 
any all weather road or not), ‘exogenous’ changes in these characteristics (in land and 
household size), and rainfall and serious illness shocks in this period. Note that the price 
changes are defined at the household level. Table 3 gives the results. One factor is hard to 
control for: the impact of the end of the civil war. However, there is little reason to expect 
a relative price change from this, and also it is likely to be a general factor in all these 
villages,  since  they  were  far  from  the  frontline,  so  for  our  purposes  this  impact  is 
probably more a ‘fixed’ effect for the entire sample, captured by the constant term. 
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Table 3  Linear regression: explaining changes in consumption 
Dependent variable: change in log food consumption between 1989 and 1994 (mean 0.3733; N=354).  
OLS regression with robust standard errors corrected for village cluster effects. 
  Model 1  Sample 
  Coeff  t-value  Mean 
Constant  0.185  (1.43)  1.000 
Ln(land in ha +0.1)  0.211  (2.07)  0.160 
D ln (land in ha + 0.1)  0.239  (3.24)  0.327 
Ln(adults in 89)  -0.090  (-1.23)  1.549 
D ln (adults)  0.287  (1.18)  0.091 
Ln (years adult education +1)  0.016  (0.07)  0.202 
Ln (number of adults serious ill+1)  -0.205  (-0.92)  0.188 
D (% real terms of trade)  0.371  (3.67)  0.263 
D (% real terms of trade) squared  0.642  (3.28)  0.187 
Surplus farmer *D (% real t. of trade)
2   0.664  (3.50)  0.015 
D ln (rain last season)  0.826  (4.12)  -0.179 
Ln (distance to town)
a  -0.223  (-2.18)  0.000 
Road infrastructure?
a  0.205  (2.36)  0.706 
Adjusted R squared    0.09   
Note: a. Road infrastructure is a dummy whether the road linking the village to the nearest town is an all-weather road 
or not. The distance variable is the distance in km to the nearest town scaled relative to the mean distance in the sample. 
 
The  results  suggest  that  many  of  these  factors  matter:  important  effects  from  road 
infrastructure  and  distance  to  town  (‘good’  geography  and  roads  meant  much  higher 
consumption growth), rainfall shocks (‘better’ rain has a strong impact), some role for 
initial characteristics (initial land) as well as exogenous changes in land.
7 But we also 
find a strong impact from the general improvement in the rural terms of trade during this 
period  of  liberalization,  with  much  larger  impact  for  surplus  farmers.  In  sum,  these 
changes in the rural terms of trade, quite clearly attributable to the reform programme, 
contributed to growth in food consumption in this period. But let us not forget that this 
effect will be negative for those who faced declining terms of trade (including on average 
one village) in this reform period. In sum, there are clearly winners and losers from this 
process of trade liberalization induced relative price changes. 
 
Of particular interest is the impact on the poor. As was seen in table 2, poverty decreased 
in this period considerably, not dissimilar to the increase in consumption.  It is possible to 
provide a decomposition of the change in consumption based on this linear regression 
using standard  Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions.  Less known is that we can also do a 
decomposition of the Watts poverty index using a linear regression based decomposition. 
The  appendix  shows  the  method.  The  result  is  that  we  can  identify  the  contributing 
factors  to  the  total  change  in  both  the  average  change  in  food  consumption  and  the 
poverty change.  
 
                                                 
7 Note that these land changes are ‘exogenous’ to the household in that land is state-owned and land is 
allocated, even though statistically we cannot exclude some placement effects and therefore problems with 
inference. Since this is not a variable of particular interest at this stage, we ignore this problem below. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS147  Page 15 
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Table 4 presents these results. First, it brings together the factors contributing to actual 
growth and poverty changes. Then, the table reports on an additional counterfactual: the 
case in which there were no reforms, so that none of the increases in returns and prices 
actually took place. The growth effect is derived simply by excluding these factors from 
the findings based on the first column of results. Since the poverty decompositions in 
contributing factors are counterfactual dependent (i.e. they are only correct to describe to 
the contributing factors to a particular overall change), they cannot be derived directly 
from the second column.  They are obtained by constructing a specific counterfactual 
distribution and then apply the decomposition as before.
8  
 
Table 4  Decomposition of growth per adult and poverty gap. (Percentage point 
contribution to total growth.) 
  Actual  Counterfactual 
    no reforms  
  growth  poverty  growth  Poverty 
increase in land  7  -11  1  -1 
changes in returns to land   0  -0     
terms of trade change  15  -30     
rainfall shock  -8  25  -8  29 
returns to road infrastructure/location  19  -17     
Constant  5  -6  5  -7 
Residual  0  3  0  6 
change in adult equiv.units  -5  7  -5  7 
percentage growth  (sum of above)  32  -29  -7  34 
Based on restricted version of model 1 in table 3, re-estimated after imposing (and testing)  
linear restriction that insignificant variables are zero. 
 
Total per adult growth (defined by the change in the logs of per adult equivant food 
consumption) was 32 percent, while the poverty gap declined by 29 percent. The table 
gives the contribution in percentage points to this change. Since the percentage change in 
both is very close in absolute terms (suggesting a scaled Watts poverty elasticity of –
0.90), the percentages can be directly compared.  
 
From table 4, it can be concluded that growth in these villages was largely fuelled by 
relative price changes induced by reforms (and probably helped by peace): better terms of 
trade prices and better returns to location explain most. Poverty reduction is determined 
by similar factors, but poor rains for some hindered the decline. Crop price increases, a 
factor most directly linked to the reforms, contributed more to the decline in poverty than 
in growth. The poor benefited somewhat more than proportionately from better returns to 
roads, even though the poor include a significant remote group with poor infrastructure. 
Poor households grew in this sample in size by more than average, contributing to lower 
per adult growth and higher poverty. Land increases for some of the poor meant that this 
disproportionately  contributed  to  poverty  reduction,  but  given  the  current  (relatively 
equal) land distribution within communities and the history of land reform in Ethiopia, 
                                                 
8 The decomposition of growth is repeated, but this time in terms of per adult real consumption. This 
simply implies an additional term defined by (minus) the change in the log of the number adult equivalent 
units in both years. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS147  Page 16 
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this is not easily repeatable, nor desirable as a strategy. Since the poor typically have low 
potential or little land, they could not benefit from the increased returns to land, relative 
to the average household. Finally, the poor suffered disproportionately from poor rains, 
limiting the poverty decline further.  
 
Nevertheless, inspecting these results further, we find that the largest part of this poverty 
decline is driven by one group. It is found that more than 80 percent of the actual poverty 
decline is accounted for by those leaving poverty between 1989 and 1994. Analysis in 
Dercon  (2005)  showed  that  they  had  relatively  good  endowments,  their  crop  prices 
increased  most  and  they  were  lucky  with  good  rains.  Those  remaining  in  poverty 
experienced limited growth; their poverty gap only declined by an insignificant 4 percent. 
With  poor  endowments  and  poorly  accessible  locations,  increased  returns  via  better 
prices were limited and virtually wiped out by poor rains. This is not dissimilar to the 
findings reported by Winters et al. (2004) from other studies: the ability to respond to the 
opportunities offered by liberalization seems to be determined by the endowments of the 
households involved. 
 
The  counterfactual  result  is  to  speculate,  using  the  econometric  model,  what  the 
consequences for local growth and poverty reduction would have been if policies had not 
changed. Recall however that the impact on prices appears to have been largely from 
liberalizing measures. In this simulation, none of the increased returns is assumed to have 
taken  place,  also  implying  a  correction  for  the  return  on  the  changes  in  land  (and 
optimistically  assuming  that  they  could  have  taken  place).  The  relatively  poor  local 
rainfall in a few villages, and population growth is then predicted to have resulted in a 7 
percent decline in per adult consumption and a 34 percent increase in poverty. Looking 
further into this, most of this increase in poverty is for poor who were poor in 1989 and 
remained poor in the actual data; those who actually moved out of poverty would have 
experienced zero poverty growth in this counterfactual scenario. This confirms that even 
if reforms did not benefit all poor households in the same way, no reforms would clearly 
have made the plight of this persistently poor group even worse.  
 
In  short,  growth  and  the  reforms  appear  to  have  been  relatively  pro-poor:  a  period 
reforms fuelled growth and reduced poverty, and the poverty reductions appear to be 
directly linked to the reforms in these villages. Nevertheless, the reforms were not pro-
all-poor: the poor with good land, good location and high producer price increases, about 
a quarter of the sample, benefited more than any other group. But a third of the sample, 
the poorly endowed poor, in terms of land and location, also experienced the lowest price 
increases and their benefits from the reforms were limited. Still, without the reforms, the 
counterfactual  analysis  suggests  that  growth  would  have  been  negative  and  poverty 
would have increased.  
 
However, we can hardly speak of ‘growth’ when consider the changes in the levels of 
consumption between two periods, relatively close to each other and the last observation 
only  a  few  years  after  the  liberalization.  In  order  to  investigate  this  further,  we 
investigated whether we could find any correlation between growth in the subsequent five 
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The analysis is hindered because many other factors could have happened in this period, 
convoluting the impact of the relative price shock, but nevertheless, a positive correlation 
would  be  strongly  suggestive  evidence  of  a  growth  effect  of  liberalization,  beyond  a 
initial level effect (a  ‘once-and-for-all’ effect, in line with standard trade theory).  To 
focus  on  the  actual  relative  price  incentive  changes  by  household  farmers,  we  did  a 
village fixed effect test, thereby fixing any other ‘village specific changes’ between 1989 
and  1994  and  subsequently.
9  Recall  again  that  the  price  changes  are  defined  at  the 
household level, and therefore are now identified using within-village variation. It should 
also be emphasized that any other variations of our test yielded the same results. Table 5 
gives the econometric findings. The first model is effectively the same as before but 
without the community variables and including village fixed effects. The second model is 
the  same  specification  on  the  right  hand  side,  but  the  now  using  the  growth  in  the 
subsequent five year, 1994-99, as the left hand side variable.  
 
The results from model 1 are (unsurprisingly) close to those from the previous regression, 
showing  significant  effects  from  increases  in  terms  of  trade,  especially  for  surplus 
farmers. But the results from model 2 are striking: there is no sign of a further ‘growth’ 
effect from the improved terms of trade. Note that there is no clear evidence of reversal 
of the earlier gains (which would be reflected in a negative and significant coefficient of 
similar value). In other words, in line with simple standard trade theory, the relative price 
change induced by liberalization induced ‘once-and-for-all’ improvement in incomes for 
those experiencing better terms of trade, but without the expected theoretical ‘growth’ 
effect in a theory of globalization. 
 Table 5  Linear regression: explaining changes in consumption 
Dependent variable: change in log food consumption between 1989 and 1994 and 1994 and 1999 (n=354)  
OLS regression with village fixed effects and robust standard errors corrected for village cluster effects. 
  Model 1: 89-94  Model 2: 94-99
 
  Coeff  t-value  Coeff  t-value 
D (% real terms of trade)  0.219  1.70  0.285  0.55 
D (% real terms of trade) squared  0.674  7.08  -0.070  0.34 
Surplus farmer *D (% real t. of trade)
2   0.643  3.27  -0.161  0.16 
Adjusted R squared    0.13    0.06 
 
There are of course limitations to the analysis above. For example, it could be argued (as 
in  Winters  et  al.  (2004))  that  ‘spillover’  effects  from  initial  growth  spurts  related  to 
liberalization  could  play  a  role,  creating  growth  externalities  for  households  or  areas 
initially  not  positively  affected  by  the  liberalization  measures.  This  could  possibly 
explain  the  findings  above,  whereby  the  village  fixed  effects  (which  are  highly 
significant) take on all effects from what was initially an effect identified even from 
within-village  variation  at  the  household  level.  Similarly,  there  is  evidence  that  can 
identify  further  some  of  the  general  sources  of  growth  in  this  period.  For  example, 
                                                 
9 The motivation was to ensure that other community wide changes, for which the model does not control, 
do not affect changes in the 1994-99 period.  However, many other specifications were tried but the general 
result  was  the  same:  the  impact  of  the  relative  price  change  of  1989-94  on  growth  in  1994-99  is 
insignificantly different from zero. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS147  Page 18 
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Dercon (2004) shows that growth in the same six villages between 1989 and 1997 was 
strongly determined by the nature of the road infrastructure connecting the village to 
other areas: the growth externalities of living in a village with a  good road result in 
almost 4 percent higher growth in consumption per year. Again, it is plausible that there 
is a complementarity between road infrastructure and liberalization, so that these villages 
with better infrastructure can benefit more. Still, this narrative is only consistent with the 
evidence and is not directly tested.  
 
In  another  paper  (Dercon,  Hoddinott  and  Woldehanna,  2005)  the  link  between  road 
infrastructure and growth was further tested in the full sample, using data between 1994 
and 1999 (based on three rounds of the ERHS). We find that yearly growth rates are 
strongly affected by road infrastructure and its quality. The regression analysis in that 
paper links growth in consumption to changes in road infrastructure and quality in a fixed 
effects  regression  framework,  providing  strong,  and  econometrically  well-identified 
effects. The effects on road quality are based on detailed investigation of the quality of 
roads: improvement in roads leading to local towns, say from a road poorly accessible to 
buses and trucks to one reasonably accessible for buses and trucks in the rainy season 
results in 3.5 percent higher growth. Improvements in accessibility due to better transport 
have  a  further  impact,  resulting  in  a  6.1  percent  higher  growth  rate  in  this  period. 
Furthermore, there is a persistent and divergent effect linked the road quality: the better 
level of past road quality increases growth, again consistent with externalities from road 
infrastructure. This also means that those with poor road infrastructure are experiencing 
systematically  lower  growth,  at  the  risk  of  being  totally  left  behind.  Again,  if 
liberalization was one of the factors necessary to offer growth opportunities for rural 
Ethiopia,  this  growth  tends  to  benefit  largely  those  with  good  geographical  and 
infrastructural endowments. Of course, the parallel with the marginalization argument at 
play at the international trade level is clear: geographical externalities (possibly induced 
by local spillovers) mean that trade benefits certain areas, not just increasing levels of 
income, but also stimulating growth, while other areas are marginalized – they may not 
gain much or even lose in the first round effects, and subsequently have lower growth, 
staying behind permanently. 
 
Overall, this leads to the following conclusions. Further liberalization, and engagement 
with the world economy in the age of globalization, may offer new opportunities for 
some rural areas. But the impact is likely be largely confined to those areas with good 
infrastructure  and  communications.  Currently,  growth  in  such  areas  appears  to  be 
outpacing growth in other areas. It is unlikely to get better without concerted efforts in 
terms of infrastructure development.  
 
5. Risk and Vulnerability in a period of Liberalization 
 
In  this  final  section,  we  will  briefly  comment  on  another  apparent  impact  of 
liberalization: the impact on the risk faced by households related to markets. It is useful 
to look at this, since the liberalization does not result only in changes in levels of income 
and the standard of living, but it also potentially introduces new risks, related to further 
integration  into  world  markets  and  the  world  economy.  Risk-related  vulnerability  to QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS147  Page 19 
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poverty  is  a  concept  that  does  not  just  look  at  the  observed  ‘ex-post’  realizations  of 
poverty, but includes the threat of poverty linked to downside risk (Calvo and Dercon 
(2005)). It could help to show whether a more comprehensive ‘poverty’ concept in the 
face of trade liberalization is fruitful, not just in terms of emphazing the change in the 
mean of income or consumption after liberalization but also the changes in downside risk 
related to liberalization. 
 
Assessing this ‘vulnerability to poverty’ is, however, very data intensive, and requires the 
calibration of outcomes in different states of the world. It typically requires the equivalent 
of a forecasting model of consumption or another dimension of wellbeing, not just of the 
household mean of consumption but also its distribution. Assessing the changes in the 
distribution of risk after liberalization in Ethiopia is not fully possible, not least since so 
many other factors have changed in recent years (including regionalization, a war with 
Eritrea, and vast market distorting aid flows), and the calibration of a counterfactual risk-
due-to-liberalization distribution was not possible. Instead, we will only present some 
suggestive evidence on the risks faced by households, and its implications. In particular, 
in 1995, we asked the 1477 households in ERHS to nominate the shocks that seriously 
affected their standard of living or asset position in the last 20 years, based on a long list 
of possible shocks. Subsequently, in 2004, we asked the same households to nominate the 
same question, but referring to the last 5 years.  The question was similar, even though 
the  order  of  questions  and  the  categories  used  were  different,  possibly  affecting  the 
answers. The findings were nevertheless very suggestive.  
 
Table 7  Shocks faced by rural households in Ethiopia 1974-1994 
Type of shocks households reported to be affected by, leading 
to  serious  loss  of  assets,  income  or  consumption,  of  those 
affected by a shock 
Percentage  of 
households 
reporting  hardship 
episode  in  last  20 
years        
Drought or other source of harvest failure  78  
Policy shock (taxation, forced labour, ban on migration, …)           42  
Illness or deaths of household members  40  
Diseases or deaths of oxen or other livestock  39  
Land problems (villagisation, land reform)       17  
Assets losses (fire, loss)       16  
War             7  
Crime/banditry (theft, violence)       3  
Source: own calculations based on Ethiopian Rural Panel Data Survey (1994-1997) QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS147  Page 20 
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Table 8  Shocks faced by rural households in Ethiopia 1999-2004 
Type of shocks households reported to be affected by, leading 
to  serious  loss  of  assets,  income  or  consumption,  of  those 
affected by a shock 
Percentage 
reporting  hardship 
episode  in  last  5 
years        
Drought  47 
Death or serious illness of head, spouse or another person  43 
Inability to sell outputs or decreases in output prices  15 
Pests or diseases that affected crops  14 
Crime/banditry (theft, violence)       13 
Difficulty in obtaining inputs or increases in input prices  11 
Policy/political  shocks  (land  redistribution,  state  confiscation 
of  assets,  resettlement,  forced  contributions  or  arbitrary 
taxation) 
7 
Pests or diseases that affected livestock  7 
 
As table 7 showed, besides natural and life-cycle risks (health, death), and diseases or 
deaths of livestock, high frequency problems relate to problems related to the economic 
and political control regime during the period 1974 until 1991: problems such forced 
labour, the ban of migration, high rural taxes, as well as related to the land tenure and 
redistribution system feature highly. Problems related to the functioning of markets were 
rarely if ever mentioned. The explanation is simple: markets were effectively repressed 
and an economic control regime was in operation instead, at times resulting in serious 
and identifiable shocks to the living standards of the households. This type of problem is 
much less prevalent by 2004, referring to the previous five years. Of course, the length of 
the recall period is relevant here but in order of importance it is definitely not anymore as 
high up the list. Instead, problems related to output markets and to input markets appear 
to feature now much more importantly. This is the main conclusion from this analysis: 
liberalization introduces new risks to households, even though others may disappear.  
 
Whether overall risks has increased or decreased cannot be assessed from these data, and 
possibly this is not the most important issue. Households use strategies to manage and 
cope  with  risks.  One  should  not  overstate  the  role  of  these  strategies:  despite  these 
strategies,  most  evidence  points  out  that  shocks  are  only  partially  handled  and 
consumption  and  other  welfare  outcomes  are  not  fully  smoothed.  Nevertheless,  the 
introduction of new risks will challenge existing mechanisms. Evidence from Dercon, 
Hoddinott  and  Woldehanna  (2005)  suggests  that  these  new  risks  are  significant  in 
affecting consumption outcomes. Table 9 shows this, with the log of consumption per 
capita in 2004 regressed on a number of characteristics in 1999, and shock variables 
based on the same questions as in table 8. Besides more ‘standard’ shocks, such as related 
to  the  drought  in  2002  and  also  illness  shocks,  the  other  two  shocks  that  show  up 
significantly relate to the inability to sell output or a collapse of output prices, or a failing 
demand  for  non-agricultural  products  in  a  particular  period.  These  shocks  appear  to 
reduce consumption in 2004 by 15-20 percent, compared to what it would have been 
without the shocks, clearly a large impact.
10  In sum, this is suggestive evidence that 
                                                 
10 Of course, this regression may suffer from missing variable bias, such as those reporting these shocks 
may have other unobservable characteristics and given that this regression could not be estimated with QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS147  Page 21 
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shifting  risks  towards  market-related  risks  may  not  have  suitable  responses,  thereby 
suggesting a possible further effect from liberalization policies, at least in the medium 
run. 
 
Table 9: Impact of shocks on (log) consumption per capita, 2004  





Drought, 2002-04  -0.163  2.46** 
Drought, 1999-2001  -0.137  2.72** 
Pests or diseases that affected crops, 2002-04  -0.006  0.07 
Pests or diseases that affected crops, 1999-2001  -0.052  1.05 
Pests or diseases that affected livestock, 2002-04   -0.002  0.18 
Pests or diseases that affected livestock, 1999-2001  0.022  0.24 
Difficulty in obtaining inputs or increases in input prices, 2002-04  0.055  0.63 
Difficulty in obtaining inputs or increases in input prices, 1999-2001  0.001  0.02 
Inability to sell outputs or decreases in output prices, 2002-04   -0.187  2.23** 
Inability to sell outputs or decreases in output prices, 1999-2001  -0.026  0.36 
Lack of demand for non-agricultural products, 2002-04   -0.037  0.19 
Lack of demand for non-agricultural products, 1999-2001  -0.195  2.28** 
Crime shocks, 2002-04   -0.018  0.36 
Crime shocks, 1999-2001  0.083  0.99 
Death of head, spouse or another person, 2002-04  0.043  0.69 
Death of head, spouse or another person, 1999-2001  -0.001  0.02 
Illness of head, spouse or another person, 2002-04   -0.019  0.32 
Illness of head, spouse or another person, 1999-2001   -0.151  2.33** 
R
2  0.34   
Sample size  1290   
Notes: 
1. Specification includes controls for Female headship, age head, schooling, household size, dependency 
ratio, land holdings (quintiles), livestock, ethnic minority, religious minority, holding official position in 
Peasant  Association  or  important  place  in  social  life,  all  in  1999.  PA  dummies,  month  of  interview 
dummies and perceptions of rainfall in previous harvest year are also included but not reported. 2. Standard 
errors are robust to locality cluster effects.  * Significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level. 





There is a close correlation between the role of trade in GDP, overall growth and poverty 
reduction in developing countries. Growth and poverty reduction has accelerated in those 
economies  that  have  successfully  increased  their  trade  share  in  income.  However, 
whether there is a direct causal link between trade policy, growth and poverty reduction 
is still disputed.  Still, the substantial poverty reductions in some developing countries, 
such as China and more recently, parts of India are beyond doubt.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
fixed effects, there is no obvious way to control for this, besides entering observable characteristics as well 
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However, for many other developing countries, globalization is still far removed. In fact, 
there  are  concerns  that  these  countries  may  well  become  further  marginalized.  The 
reasons include poor policy environment but also poor geographical endowments. It will 
be a difficult task to stop this process of marginalization, not least since there are risks 
that  they  may  get  trapped  in  permanently  low  growth  and  high  poverty  due  to  the 
externalities related to globalization and marginalization. Concerned efforts within these 
countries  with  substantial  outside  support  are  likely  to  be  needed  to  improve  the 
investment climate in these economies.  
 
There  is  some  evidence  that  particular  groups  and  areas  may  also  risk  becoming 
marginalized within the globalizing economies. High growth may provide the means to 
avoid this process to become self-perpetuating, but action would in any case be needed. 
The factors correlated with this marginalization are typically poor local endowments in 
terms of geography and infrastructure, as well as poor household endowments in terms of 
labour and assets. In many ways, the factors causing marginalization on the global scale 
are similar to the factors causing within-country marginalization. 
  
These insights were illustrated using Ethiopia as a case study. Ethiopia has started a 
process of market and international trade liberalization, but definitely still belongs to the 
group of ‘marginalized’ economies in the world.  Growth remains limited, and poverty is 
highly persistent. The welfare impact of the domestic market liberalization in the first 
part of the 1990s also illustrates the risks related to further marginalization of some of the 
poor in Ethiopia. While one substantial group of the poor has been able to take advantage 
of  the  recent  improved  economic  environment,  another  group  seems  to  have  become 
increasingly marginalized. Investment in infrastructure provides one useful strategy to 
overcome some of their inherent marginal endowments in terms of infrastructure and 
other assets.  The evidence from the 1990s from Ethiopia reported in the paper suggests 
that improving infrastructure had very substantial growth effects. In any case, geographic 
diversity  in  these  infrastructural  investments  seems  to  be  correlated  with  differential 
growth experience, suggesting that more marginal areas within Ethiopia are risking to 
become even more marginalized. 
 
One should also realize that liberalization and more market orientation will bring other 
risks, which households have to find ways of coping with. Evidence from self-reported 
shocks suggests that market related risks (in the form of failing demand or price shocks) 
are more common now than they were before liberalization. This does not have to be a 
fundamental problem, since other risks (such as locally covariate risks) may be better 
spread across geographical areas. Nevertheless, it points to the need for other instruments  
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Appendix: A Regression based Poverty Decomposition  
Suppose  we  are  specifically  interested  in  investigating  the  contribution  to  poverty 
changes of some variables crucial in explaining growth.  We use an additive separable 
poverty index that is for each person linear in log consumption. The normalised poverty 
gap, defined over the log of consumption as the underlying welfare measure, satisfies this 
property.  
 
Following Dercon (2006), formally, denote z as the log of the poverty line, yht  the log of 
consumption of household h at t, and qt as the number of people falling below the poverty 
line at time t and n as the total number of individuals, which are observed over time. If 
we  order  all  individuals  from  poor  to  rich  in  each  period,  then  this  measure  can  be 
defined as: 











P    (1) 
 
Let us consider two periods of time, 0 and 1, and introduce a specific counterfactual, in 
which the change of consumption over time is equal to Xh. For example, this could be the 
change in consumption stemming from the actual change in one of the endowments (as 
used  in  the  regression  analysis  in  the  main  text).  It  is  then  possible  to  calculate  the 
counterfactual consumption for person h, yh1
*, as:  
    h 0 h
*
1 h X y y + =   (2)   
Given  this  change,  the  number  of  poor  will  change.  Let  us  call  the  actual  and 
counterfactual number of poor in period 0 and 1 respectively q0 and q1
*. We can then 
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Let us now order the individuals, so that the poor in both periods are from h=1,... q
*
11, 




01 (i.e. non-poor in period 0 and poor in period 




10, and finally, those non-poor in 
each period as h=q
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P P   (4) 
 
i.e. the change in the gap consist of the change of the gap of those poor in both periods, 
plus the gap of those poor in the second but not in the first period, minus the gap in the 
first period of those leaving poverty.
11 Dividing the left and right hand side of (4) by (P1
*-
                                                 
11 As suggested earlier and using the notation as before, the Watts poverty measure is defined as: QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS147  Page 25 
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P0) yields a decomposition in terms of the contribution to the total poverty change of 
those staying poor, those becoming poor and those leaving poverty. Note that this is an 
additive decomposition. This can be rewritten in terms of changes in consumption. The 
part in brackets in the first term of (4) is directly defined in terms of yh1
*- yh0  = Xh.  Pre-
multiplying the terms within the summation sign for each of the two subsequent terms by 
(yh0- yh1
*)/(yh0- yh1
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This  expression  suggests  (rather  self-evidently)  that  when  calculating  the  total 
counterfactual poverty change, for households who leave or enter into poverty, only the 
consumption change up to or counting from the poverty line will be taken into account, 
while for those staying poor, their entire consumption change is relevant.  This allows us 
to define the share of the consumption change that has to be taken into account as: 
  1 s*
h =     for qh Î {1,…q11
*},  (6a) 
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=    for qh Î {q01
* +1,…,q10
*}  (6c) 
     
Note  that  these  shares  sh*  are  dependent  on  the  specific  counterfactual  studied,  and 
between zero and one. 
 

















  (7) 
 
Equation (7) may seem only of limited interest: if only one factor is considered in the 
counterfactual, the equation only describes what in practice is calculated via simulations. 
Calculating the weights sh* is probably more time consuming than calculating the change 
in  poverty  directly  from  the  derived  and  the  actual  distribution.  Furthermore,  (7)  is 
restricted  to  very  specific  poverty  measures,  while  micro-simulations  can  handle  any 
measure.  Nevertheless,  (7)  becomes  more  interesting  when  X  is  itself  determined  by 
different variables. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 








so that the decomposition is effectively a decomposition of the Watts poverty measure. Just as the squared 
poverty gap, it is convex in levels of consumption, implying that consumption levels far below the poverty 
line have a higher weight than levels closer to the poverty line, unlike the poverty gap, which is linear in 
levels of consumption.  
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First, let us consider a case in which the counterfactual consists of two parts (V and W), 
and assume that for each h, Xh =Vh + Wh.  Now (7) can be used to study the contribution 
of each factor Vh and Wh in the total counterfactual change. For a given total change in 
































  (8) 
 
This implies that, for a given total change, the contribution of different factors to the 
change in poverty can be directly derived from (8). Note that these contributions sum to 
one, but also that they  are always defined relative to a particular total counterfactual 
change. For example, let us define P1
V (P1
W) as poverty in period 1 when V (W) has been 
added  to  yh0.  Even  though  (yh0  +  Xh)  =  (yh0  +  Vh  +  Wh),  it  can  be  easily  seen  that 






1 - + - ¹ - .   
    
In other words, the total poverty change due to adding both V and W to consumption is 
not simply equal to the poverty change induced by adding V and W separately. This 
means that the decomposition has to be carefully interpreted. (8) can be easily generalised 
to more factors, it will be used below to interpret the contribution to poverty changes of 
different factors linked to economic reform.  
 
One  counterfactual  is  of  particular  interest  for  the  current  research:  assessing  the 
contribution of different factors to the actual observed total change in poverty (P1-P0). 
With an appropriate  residual term (eh), equation (1) provides a prediction model for 
changes in consumption for each person, based on different factors. Or, more in general, 
suppose Xh = Vh + Wh + eh. Equation (8) can then be rewritten as (dropping asterisks, 
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Equation (9) provide then simple ways of describing the contribution of these different 
factors (and the error term) to the observed poverty changes, using shares sh based on the 
actual observed poverty transitions.  It shows a direct link between changes in individual 
consumption over time and the poverty outcome.  The overall result is a decomposition 
of the poverty gap into the effects of changes in fixed endowments, changes in input and 
output prices, and random events, for a given total change in poverty. The decomposition 
will now be applied to data related to 1989 and 1994/95, before and after a major set of 
reform measures was implemented. The decomposition of consumption changes is exact 
when using an estimation method which impose that that the sum of the residuals is zero, 
such  as  OLS.  Decompositions  based  on  (9)  are  additive  in  terms  of  the  contributing 
factors but not exact and the contribution of the error term will have to be added.  
 